Strait of Hormuz Follow-On Research
As of 2026-04-04
PoI Profile
| field | value |
|---|
| poi_id | strait-of-hormuz |
| title | Strait of Hormuz |
| poi_type | chokepoint |
| category | maritime_oil_chokepoint |
| as_of_date | 2026-04-04 |
| location_description | Strategic maritime passage between Iran and Oman connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea |
| wgs84_latitude | 26.5660 |
| wgs84_longitude | 56.2500 |
Identity status is unambiguous. Typing rationale: this is a constrained maritime transit node where disruption creates outsized downstream effects across oil, LNG, fertilizer, shipping insurance, and naval operations. Alias handling: no additional alias was required for this update cycle.
Research Scope and Priority
This update supports a simple decision question: has the Strait of Hormuz moved from a stressed-transit problem into a sustained throughput-collapse problem with second-order spillovers beyond oil? Priority is high because the March 2026 crisis materially changed the corridor from a theoretical chokepoint to an actively disrupted one. The escalation threshold for another immediate refresh is any of the following: a recognized formal closure notice, a sustained rebound in commercial transits above current crisis levels, verified sea-mine deployment, or a new official estimate showing a sharp change in seafarer entrapment, vessel attacks, or restored safe-passage arrangements.
Executive Summary
The Strait of Hormuz remains the most consequential global oil-shipping chokepoint by structural baseline, but the main change since the earlier March deep dive is that the corridor is now operating as a crisis-constrained waterway rather than merely a high-risk one. EIA's March 3, 2026 update still anchors the strategic baseline at 20.9 million barrels/day of oil flows and 11.4 Bcf/day of LNG in 1H25, with only partial bypass capacity available. Since the conflict escalation that began on 2026-02-28, official maritime and UN sources indicate that vessel attacks, electronic interference, stranded crews, and commercial self-deterrence have pushed actual traffic far below normal. JMIC's 2026-03-16 advisory recorded only 3 observed commercial cargo transits per day against historical Strait traffic of about 138/day, while UNCTAD's 2026-03-30 analysis said shipping through Hormuz had collapsed by over 95%. The most credible near-term disruption scenario is not a formal legal closure but an extended period of suppressed commercial throughput caused by combined kinetic, navigational, insurance, and humanitarian constraints. The likely operational impact window is measured in weeks rather than hours, with the April 2 IMO update indicating the crisis remains active and unresolved.
Core Claims and Evidence Matrix
| claim_id | claim_text | metric_value | metric_unit | observation_date | source_url | source_type | confidence | conflicting_source_url | notes |
|---|
| C1 | The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea between Oman and Iran and remains one of the world's most important oil chokepoints. | 1 | geography_fact | 2026-03-03 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official_analysis | high | | Baseline identity claim. |
| C2 | Total oil flows through Hormuz averaged 20.9 million barrels/day in 1H25, equal to about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and one-quarter of global maritime traded oil. | 20.9 | million_bpd | 2025-06-30 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official_analysis | high | | Structural throughput baseline from EIA. |
| C3 | LNG flows through Hormuz averaged 11.4 Bcf/day in 1H25, representing over 20% of global LNG trade. | 11.4 | Bcf_per_day | 2025-06-30 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official_analysis | high | | LNG exposure remains concentrated in Qatari exports. |
| C4 | Saudi and UAE bypass routes together provide about 4.7 million barrels/day of bypass capacity, far below normal Hormuz throughput. | 4.7 | million_bpd | 2025-06-30 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official_analysis | high | | Alternative capacity is material but insufficient. |
| C5 | About 89% of crude oil and condensate moving through Hormuz in 1H25 went to Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for 74% combined. | 89 | percent_of_crude_condensate_flows | 2025-06-30 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official_analysis | high | | Exposure remains concentrated in Asian importers. |
| C6 | MARAD's active 2026-004 advisory says risks of Iranian attacks against commercial shipping remain high and explicitly warns of missile, UAV, USV, and GNSS-jamming threats in the Strait region. | 1 | active_maritime_alert | 2026-03-13 | https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels | official_advisory | high | | Current U.S. maritime operational warning. |
| C7 | JMIC assessed the regional threat environment as CRITICAL on 2026-03-16, with 20 confirmed maritime incidents since 1 March, historical Strait traffic around 138/day, and current observed commercial cargo traffic at 3 vessels/day. | 3 | cargo_vessels_per_day | 2026-03-15 | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 | official_advisory | high | | JMIC traffic and threat snapshot. |
| C8 | IMO's extraordinary session on 19 March 2026 condemned attacks and the purported closure of the Strait and called for an internationally coordinated safe-passage framework. | 1 | coordinated_safe_passage_call | 2026-03-19 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/IMO-calls-for-safe-passage-framework-in-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | official_statement | high | | Signals multilateral recognition that normal merchant transit conditions had broken down. |
| C9 | UNCTAD reported on 30 March 2026 that shipping through Hormuz had collapsed by over 95%, with daily transits falling from an average of 103 vessels in the last week of February to single digits within weeks. | 95 | percent_plus_traffic_decline | 2026-03-30 | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade | official_analysis | medium | | Dynamic traffic claim; use as a crisis-period indicator rather than a long-term baseline. |
| C10 | IMO reported on 2 April 2026 that it had confirmed 21 attacks on commercial ships since 28 February, with 10 seafarer fatalities and around 20,000 civilian seafarers still aboard vessels in the Persian Gulf. | 21 | confirmed_attacks | 2026-04-02 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/Fragmented-responses-are-no-longer-sufficient-IMO-SG-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | official_statement | high | | Humanitarian and operational persistence indicator. |
| C11 | Hormuz disruption is now a fertilizer-market problem as well as an energy-market problem: UNCTAD said around one-third of global seaborne fertilizer volumes pass through the Strait. | 33 | percent_global_seaborne_fertilizer_trade | 2026-03-30 | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade | official_analysis | medium | | Broadens consequence set beyond oil and LNG. |
Quantitative Baselines
| metric_name | baseline_value | unit | time_window | source_url | notes |
|---|
| Total oil flow through Hormuz | 20.9 | million_bpd | 1H25 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | Most recent structural baseline published by EIA as of 2026-03-03. |
| LNG flow through Hormuz | 11.4 | Bcf_per_day | 1H25 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | LNG exposure remains centered on Qatar-origin flows. |
| Bypass pipeline capacity (Saudi + UAE) | 4.7 | million_bpd | contingency capacity | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | Material but insufficient substitute for normal Strait throughput. |
| Historical average daily Strait traffic | 138 | vessel_transits_per_day | historical reference | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 | JMIC cites this as a comparison point for current suppression. |
| Observed commercial cargo traffic | 3 | cargo_vessels_per_day | 2026-03-15 snapshot | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 | Crisis-period indicator, not a stable baseline. |
| Seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf | 20000 | people | 2026-04-02 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/Fragmented-responses-are-no-longer-sufficient-IMO-SG-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | Humanitarian and crewing stress indicator. |
The core baseline interpretation is now split into two layers. Structural normal-operation metrics still come from EIA's 1H25 throughput estimates because they are the most authoritative cross-market baseline. Current crisis-state metrics come from JMIC, IMO, and UNCTAD and show that actual traffic is operating far below those structural levels. Seasonal interpretation remains secondary to conflict effects in this update cycle; the dominant explanatory variable is security disruption, not routine shipping seasonality.
Geography
The Strait's strategic relevance comes from corridor geometry plus flow concentration. It is wide and deep enough for very large crude carriers, but it remains a narrow shared route where major Gulf oil exporters, Qatari LNG cargoes, war-risk insurers, and coalition naval movements interact in a confined space. EIA's structural point remains valid: alternatives can bypass only a portion of normal volumes, so the geography is not merely narrow, it is difficult to replace at scale.
Adjacent context matters operationally. MARAD continues to recommend that eastbound vessels transit close to Omani territorial waters when conditions permit, which indicates that route placement near the southern side of the corridor remains tactically relevant. JMIC's March 16 update also makes clear that "Hormuz risk" includes port approaches, anchorages, offshore transfers, and adjacent Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf waters, not only the central traffic separation scheme. Environmental ambiguity is not the lead issue in this cycle; the key spatial ambiguity is how much dark traffic or non-AIS movement is still occurring despite the severe suppression in observed cargo transits. Next action: check the next JMIC or IMO traffic update for any revised traffic-monitoring methodology or observed rebound.
History and Timeline
| date | event | impact | source_url |
|---|
| 2025-08-13 | MARAD issued advisory 2025-009 on illegal boarding, detention, and seizure risk in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. | Confirms the pre-crisis harassment/seizure pattern and routing guidance near Oman. | https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2025-009-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-illegal-boarding-detention-seizure |
| 2026-02-28 | JMIC said no officially communicated closure had been issued through recognized maritime safety channels, although traffic was reduced. | Important distinction between legal closure and degraded operational conditions. | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/001-jmic-advisory-note-28_feb_2026.pdf |
| 2026-03-06 | IMO Secretary-General said at least four seafarers were reportedly killed in a Strait attack on 6 March and around 20,000 seafarers remained stranded in the Persian Gulf. | Confirms lethal escalation and humanitarian consequences. | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/IMO-secretary-general-statement-strait-of-hormuz-seafarer-deaths-unacceptable.aspx |
| 2026-03-13 | MARAD issued active advisory 2026-004, superseding 2026-001. | Reframes the threat set around missile, UAV, USV, and GNSS-jamming risk. | https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels |
| 2026-03-16 | JMIC Update 016 reported CRITICAL risk and only three observed commercial cargo transits per day against roughly 138/day historical traffic. | Provides the clearest official evidence of throughput collapse. | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 |
| 2026-03-19 | IMO extraordinary council called for an internationally coordinated safe-passage framework. | Indicates that normal civilian shipping conditions could not simply be assumed to resume unaided. | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/IMO-calls-for-safe-passage-framework-in-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx |
| 2026-03-30 | UNCTAD said shipping through Hormuz had collapsed by over 95%. | Elevates second-order fertilizer and trade effects in addition to energy impacts. | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade |
| 2026-04-02 | IMO said it had confirmed 21 attacks on commercial shipping since 28 February. | Confirms the crisis remained active into April. | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/Fragmented-responses-are-no-longer-sufficient-IMO-SG-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx |
Visible trend statement: the corridor has moved from a latent strategic chokepoint into a directly disrupted operating area with confirmed attacks, severe navigation interference, and humanitarian entrapment. Watch items for the next cycle are any safe-passage implementation details, evidence of restored routine transits, or new formal navigational restrictions.
Trivia
| trivia_item | date_or_period | indicator_type | source_url | confidence | notes |
|---|
| The current crisis has become notable not only for shipping disruption but for the large number of civilian seafarers reportedly trapped aboard vessels in the Gulf. | 2026-04-02 | humanitarian_marker | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/Fragmented-responses-are-no-longer-sufficient-IMO-SG-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | high | Not trivia in the casual sense, but a distinctive corridor-specific operational fact worth retaining. |
| A common misconception is that disruption requires a formally declared closure. JMIC explicitly said on 2026-02-28 that no formal closure had been communicated even as traffic had already fallen. | 2026-02-28 | misconception_correction | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/001-jmic-advisory-note-28_feb_2026.pdf | high | This is analytically important and frequently misunderstood. |
| No strongly sourced film, documentary, or recurring cultural-event hook was collected in this update. | unknown | cultural_linkage_status | | low | Leave for a non-operational enrichment pass if needed. |
Economy and Immediate Surroundings
| indicator | latest_value | unit | geography_scope | observation_date | source_url | notes |
|---|
| Brent crude reaction above $90/barrel | 90_plus | USD_per_barrel | global energy market | 2026-03-10 | https://unctad.org/news/hormuz-shipping-disruptions-raise-risks-energy-fertilizers-and-vulnerable-economies | Early UNCTAD shock indicator from the first major crisis analysis. |
| Nitrogen fertilizer export share from countries in the region | 13 | percent_global_exports | regional producer bloc | 2026-03-30 | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade | Shows immediate surroundings matter to fertilizer supply, not only transit. |
| Phosphate fertilizer nutrient export share from countries in the region | 9 | percent_global_exports | regional producer bloc | 2026-03-30 | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade | Supports broader agricultural trade exposure. |
The largest downside pathway remains global rather than purely local. First-order effects hit tanker availability, marine insurance, oil and gas prices, and Gulf export scheduling. Second-order effects now include fertilizer affordability, food-system input stress, and financing strain for vulnerable import-dependent economies. The local economy immediately around the Strait is relevant mainly through port operations, bunkering, offshore infrastructure, and Gulf export logistics rather than through a single adjacent city or district metric. A good next-data action is to collect updated port status and bunkering data for Fujairah, Duqm, and adjacent Gulf facilities if this dossier is being used for logistics-specific planning.
Dependencies and Alternatives
The dependency map is straightforward. Upstream, Gulf crude, condensate, and LNG export systems still feed into the Strait as their dominant maritime outlet. Downstream, Asia remains the primary sink for crude and condensate, with additional spillover into European and global energy pricing, fertilizer production costs, and shipping finance.
This PoI remains a single-point-of-failure in practical commercial terms even if it is not a literal single route in legal or geospatial terms. Alternatives exist, but EIA's baseline shows they cover only a fraction of normal flows. Saudi and UAE bypass pipelines can partially cushion oil disruption, but not replace normal throughput. LNG flexibility is weaker because the same corridor remains central to Qatari exports. The first-break dependency judgment is therefore commercial confidence in safe navigation rather than a narrow legal test of closure. Once operators, charterers, and insurers conclude that transit is not commercially tolerable, throughput collapses even before a formal blockade exists.
Comparative Context
| comparator_poi | dimension | this_poi | comparator | interpretation | source_url |
|---|
| Strait of Malacca | Oil throughput | 20.9 million bpd in 1H25 | 23.2 million bpd in 1H25 | Malacca carried slightly more oil in 1H25, but Hormuz remains more disruption-sensitive because of weaker substitution and stronger Gulf export concentration. | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ |
| Bab el-Mandeb | Oil throughput | 20.9 million bpd in 1H25 | 4.2 million bpd in 1H25 | Hormuz is the larger energy chokepoint by far, even though both are conflict-exposed. | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ |
| Strait of Malacca | Crisis traffic suppression | 3 observed commercial cargo transits/day on 2026-03-15 snapshot | no comparable collapse cited in the same source set | Hormuz's current problem is not just strategic importance but exceptional operating suppression. | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 |
Priority confirmation status: Hormuz remains the most important current maritime energy chokepoint in this source set because it combines high baseline volume with acute conflict-driven throughput collapse. Sensitivity note: the comparative argument is robust on structural throughput, but real-time traffic suppression remains a fast-moving metric and should be refreshed with each new official advisory cycle.
Scenario Analysis
| scenario | trigger | probability_band | impact_summary | lead_indicators | recovery_assumption |
|---|
| Baseline stressed transit | Corridor remains open in principle but under active alerting and high insurance/security friction | Medium | A limited number of commercial movements continue, but pricing, crewing, and routing penalties stay elevated | Updated MARAD active advisories, continued IMO safe-passage diplomacy, modest rebound in JMIC-observed cargo traffic | Recovery requires more than absence of attacks; operators must regain confidence in safe transit conditions |
| Sustained suppression | Continued attacks, GNSS interference, and insurer/operator caution keep traffic near crisis-era lows without formal closure | High | Throughput remains far below structural capacity, with strong effects on oil, gas, fertilizer, freight, and seafarer welfare | JMIC reports of very low observed transits, IMO attack counts, UNCTAD market-spillover updates | Recovery is slow and sequenced through coordinated safe passage, crew rotation, and security guarantees |
| Severe denial / functional shutdown | Formal exclusion measures, mining, repeated multi-vessel strikes, or failed safe-passage diplomacy render routine transit operationally unacceptable | Medium | Extreme oil and LNG shock, deeper fertilizer and food-security effects, major naval coordination burden, potential environmental emergency | Recognized closure warnings, mine reports, zero or near-zero cargo transits for multiple reporting cycles, rapidly rising casualty counts | Recovery depends on de-escalation plus coordinated international maritime security and humanitarian arrangements |
Counterevidence and Uncertainty Ledger
| uncertainty_id | issue | affected_claims | confidence_impact | resolution_action | owner |
|---|
| U1 | Actual total transits may exceed observed AIS-derived figures because dark traffic and GNSS disruption can reduce visibility. | C7, C9 | medium | Re-check next JMIC traffic assessment and any IMO or UN technical traffic datasets. | analyst |
| U2 | Structural throughput numbers are current only through 1H25, so they do not measure actual 2026 crisis-period realized oil and LNG movement. | C2, C3, C4, C5 | low | Replace with 2026 realized-flow estimates when EIA, IEA, or another authoritative source publishes them. | analyst |
| U3 | The crisis is evolving quickly; attack counts, seafarer totals, and traffic suppression can change materially between updates. | C6, C7, C8, C9, C10 | medium | Refresh whenever IMO, MARAD, JMIC, or UNCTAD issue a new corridor-wide update. | analyst |
Evidence that disruption risk could be overstated still exists. JMIC's 2026-02-28 note made clear that no formal closure had been recognized through standard maritime safety channels, and AIS-derived measurements are inherently incomplete under jamming or dark-ship conditions. Even so, the weight of official evidence now points toward a corridor whose practical commercial functionality is severely impaired. The strongest mitigation offset remains alternative pipelines plus any internationally coordinated safe-passage arrangement, but neither currently restores normal trade behavior.
Type-Specific Handoff
Chokepoint handoff status:
- Baseline throughput completed using EIA structural data.
- Disruption mechanics completed using MARAD, JMIC, IMO, and UNCTAD updates.
- Downstream impact completed with explicit oil, LNG, fertilizer, freight, and humanitarian consequences.
- Missing information is recorded as
unknown where exact realized 2026 throughput or dark-traffic volumes are not yet available. - Type-specific findings are consistent with the evidence matrix and scenario analysis.
Confidence
confidence_level: high on structural importance, dependency concentration, and current crisis seriousness.disagreements: No strong source conflict on the existence of severe disruption; the main disagreement is between legal-closure framing and practical-throughput framing.guardrail_warnings: Do not equate AIS-observed traffic with exact total transits. Do not convert structural EIA baselines into realized March-April 2026 throughput without new direct evidence. Do not treat a lack of formal closure as evidence of normal operation.
The most important evidence gap is precise realized oil and LNG throughput during the current conflict period. That gap limits confidence on exact market-volume loss, but not on the broader judgment that the corridor is operating far below normal commercial functionality.
Gaps / Next Steps
1. Re-check UKMTO/JMIC and IMO within the next update cycle for any revised traffic, casualty, or safe-passage figures. 2. Watch for authoritative realized-flow estimates from EIA, IEA, or producer/ship-tracking syntheses that quantify actual March-April 2026 oil and LNG movement. 3. Add port-status and bunkering updates for Fujairah and adjacent Gulf facilities if the dossier is needed for logistics planning rather than strategic monitoring alone.
Source Log
| # | Source URL | Source Type | Publisher | Date | Claim Supported |
|---|
| 1 | https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ | official analysis | U.S. Energy Information Administration | 2026-03-03 | Identity, oil/LNG throughput, Asian exposure, bypass capacity, comparator context |
| 2 | https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2025-009-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-illegal-boarding-detention-seizure | official advisory | U.S. MARAD | 2025-08-13 | Boarding/seizure risk pattern and eastbound transit guidance near Oman |
| 3 | https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels | official advisory | U.S. MARAD | 2026-03-13 | Active attack, GNSS interference, and standoff guidance |
| 4 | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/001-jmic-advisory-note-28_feb_2026.pdf | official advisory | Joint Maritime Information Center | 2026-02-28 | No formally communicated closure despite reduced traffic |
| 5 | https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-016---jmic-advisory-note-16_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=41f524bfd5514b9482225524ff1500f9 | official advisory | Joint Maritime Information Center | 2026-03-16 | Critical threat level, traffic suppression, incident count, GNSS interference |
| 6 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/IMO-secretary-general-statement-strait-of-hormuz-seafarer-deaths-unacceptable.aspx | official statement | International Maritime Organization | 2026-03-06 | Fatal attack reporting and stranded-seafarer estimate |
| 7 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/IMO-calls-for-safe-passage-framework-in-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | official statement | International Maritime Organization | 2026-03-19 | Council condemnation, safe-passage framework call, GNSS-jamming concern |
| 8 | https://unctad.org/news/hormuz-shipping-disruptions-raise-risks-energy-fertilizers-and-vulnerable-economies | official analysis/news | UN Trade and Development | 2026-03-10 | Initial macro spillover signal, energy/fertilizer exposure, price reaction |
| 9 | https://unctad.org/news/gas-grain-fertilizer-disruptions-raise-risks-food-security-and-trade | official analysis/news | UN Trade and Development | 2026-03-30 | Over-95% traffic collapse claim, fertilizer-market and food-system exposure |
| 10 | https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/Fragmented-responses-are-no-longer-sufficient-IMO-SG-Strait-of-Hormuz.aspx | official statement | International Maritime Organization | 2026-04-02 | Confirmed attack count, fatalities, stranded-seafarer persistence |